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Abstract
We investigate a framework of Krivine realizability with I/O effects, and present a method of
associating realizability models to specifications on the I/O behavior of processes, by using ad-
equate interpretations of the central concepts of pole and proof-like term. This method does in
particular allow to associate realizability models to computable functions.
Following recent work of Streicher and others we show how these models give rise to triposes
and toposes.
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1 Introduction
Krivine realizability with side effects has been introduced by Miquel in [14]. In this article
we demonstrate how an instance of Miquel’s framework including I/O instructions allows
to associate realizability toposes to specifications, i.e. sets of requirements imposed on the
I/O behavior of programs. Since the requirement to compute a specific function f can be
viewed as a specification, we do in particular obtain a way to associate toposes to computable
functions.
These toposes are different from traditional ‘Kleene’ realizability toposes such as the
effective topos [6] in that we associate toposes to individual computable functions, whereas
the effective topos incorporates all recursive functions on equal footing. Another difference to
the toposes based on Kleene realizability is that the internal logic of the latter is constructive,
whereas the present approach is based on Krivine’s realizability interpretation [10], which
validates classical logic.
To represent specifications we make use of the fact that Krivine’s realizability interpreta-
tion is parametric over a set of processes called the pole. The central observation (Lemma 27
and Theorem 28) is that non-trivial specifications on program behavior give rise to poles
leading to consistent (i.e. non-degenerate) interpretations.
To give a categorical account of Krivine realizability we follow recent work of Streicher [18]
and others [17, 20, 2], which demonstrates how Krivine realizability models give rise to triposes.
Toposes are then obtained via the tripos-to-topos construction [7].
Our basic formalism is an extension of the Krivine machine (2) that gives an operational
semantics to I/O instructions for single bits. We give two formulations of the operational
semantics – one (3) in terms of a transition relation on processes including a state (which
is adequate for reasoning about function computation), and one (4) in terms of a labeled
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transition system admitting to reason about program equivalence in terms of bisimulation.
The two operational semantics are related by Corollary 7, which we use to prove a Turing
completeness result in Theorem 12.
1.1 Related work
The idea of adding instructions with new evaluation rules to the machine plays a central role
in Krivine’s writings, as a means to realize non-logical axioms. Citing from [11]:
“Indeed, when we realize usual axioms of mathematics, we need to introduce, one
after the other, the very standard tools in system programming: for the law of Peirce,
these are continuations (particularly useful for exceptions); for the axiom of dependent
choice, these are the clock and the process numbering; for the ultrafilter axiom and the
well ordering of R, these are no less than I/O instructions on a global memory, in
other words assignment.”
Although features like exceptions and memory are often called effects, it is arguable whether
they should be called side effects, since they do not interact with the outside world.
The idea to add instructions for side effects which are influenced by – and influence – the
outside world,p has already been investigated by Miquel [14, Section 2.2], and our execution
relation (3) can be viewed as an instance of his framework.
What sets the present approach apart is that Miquel views the state of the world
(represented by a forcing condition) as being part of a process and requires poles to be
saturated w.r.t. all (including effectful) reductions, whereas for us poles are sets of ‘bare’
processes without state, which are saturated only w.r.t. reduction free of side-effects.
This difference is crucial in that it enables the construction of poles from specifications.
2 Syntax and machine
In this section we recall Krivine’s abstract machine with continuations as described in [10].
We then go on to describe an extension of the syntax by I/O instructions, and describe an
operational semantics as a transition relation on triples (p, ι, o) of process, input, and output.
2.1 Krivine’s machine
We recall the underlying syntax and machine of Krivine’s classical realizability from [10].
The syntax consists of three syntactic classes called terms, stacks, and processes.
Terms: t ::= x | λx.t | t t | cc | kpi
Stacks: pi ::= pi0 | t·pi t closed, pi0 ∈ Π0
Processes: p ::= t ? pi t closed
(1)
Thus, the terms are the terms of the λ-calculus, augmented by a constant cc for call/cc, and
continuation terms kpi for any stack pi. A stack, in turn, is a list of closed terms terminated
by an element pi0 of a designated set Π0 of stack constants. A process is a pair t ? pi of a
closed term and a stack. The set of closed terms is denoted by Λ, the set of stacks is Π, and
the set of processes is Λ?Π.
Krivine’s machine is now defined by a transition relation  on processes called evaluation.
(push) tu ? pi  t ? u·pi
(pop) (λx . t[x]) ? u·pi  t[u] ? pi
(save) cc ? t·pi  t ? kpi·pi
(restore) kpi ? t·ρ  t ? pi
(2)
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The first two rules implement weak head reduction of λ-terms, and the third and fourth rule
capture and restore continuations.
2.2 The machine with I/O
To incorporate I/O we modify the syntax as follows:
Terms: t ::= x | λx.t | t t | cc | kpi | r | w1 | w0 | end
Stacks: pi ::= ε | t·pi t closed
Processes: p ::= t ? pi | > t closed
The grammar for terms is extended by constants r,w0,w1, end for reading, writing and
termination, and in exchange the stack constants are omitted – ε is the empty stack. Finally
there is a process constant > also representing termination – the presence of both end and >
will be important in Section 3.
We write Λe and Πe for the sets of terms and stacks of the syntax with I/O, and P for
the set of processes. Furthermore, we denote by Λp the set of pure terms, i.e. terms not
containing any of r,w0,w1, end.
The operational semantics of the extended syntax is given in terms of execution contexts,
which are triples (p, ι, o) of a process p, and a pair ι, o ∈ {0, 1}∗ of binary strings representing
input and output. On these execution contexts, we define the execution relation  as follows:
(τ) ( t ? pi, ι, o)  (u ? ρ, ι, o) whenever t ? pi  u ? ρ
(r0) ( r ? t·u·v·pi, 0ι, o)  ( t ? pi, ι, o)
(r1) ( r ? t·u·v·pi, 1ι, o)  (u ? pi, ι, o)
(rε) ( r ? t·u·v·pi, ε, o)  (v ? pi, ε, o)
(w0) ( w0 ? t·pi, ι, o)  ( t ? pi, ι, 0o)
(w1) ( w1 ? t·pi, ι, o)  ( t ? pi, ι, 1o)
(e) (end ? pi, ι, o)  ( > , ι, o)
(3)
Thus, if there is neither of r,w0,w1, end in head position, the process is reduced as in (2)
without changing ι and o. If r is in head position, the computation selects one of the first
three arguments depending on whether the input starts with a 0, a 1, or is empty. w0 and
w1 write out 0 and 1, and end discards the stack and yields >, which represents successful
termination.
We observe that the execution relation is deterministic, i.e. for every execution context
there is at most one transition possible, which is determined by the term in head position,
and in case of r also by the input.
2.3 Representing functions
We view the above formalism as a model of computation that explicitly includes reading of
input, and writing of output.
Consequently, when thinking about expressivity we are not so much interested in the
ability of the machine to transform abstract representations of data like ‘Church numerals’,
but rather in the functions on binary strings that processes can compute by reading their
argument from the input, and writing the result to the output.
I Definition 1. For n ∈ N, bin(n) ∈ {0, 1}∗ is the base 2 representation of n. 0 is represented
by the empty string, thus we have e.g. bin(0) = ε, bin(1) = 1, bin(2) = 10, bin(3) = 11, . . .
A process p is said to implement a partial function f : N ⇀ N, if (p,bin(n), ε)  ∗
(>, ε,bin(f(n))) for all n ∈ dom(f).
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I Remark. There is a stronger version of the previous definition which requires (p, bin(n), ε)
to diverge or block for n 6∈ dom(f), and a completeness result like Thm. 12 can be shown for
the strengthened definition as well.
We use the weaker version, since we expect the poles ‚f defined in Section 5.2.1 to be
better behaved this way.
2.4 β-reduction
To talk about contraction of single β-redexes which are not necessarily in head position in a
process p, we define contexts – which are terms/stacks/processes with a single designated
hole [·] in term position – by the following grammar:
Term contexts: t[·] ::= [·] | λx.t[·] | t[·] t | t t[·] | kpi[·]
Stack contexts: pi[·] ::= t·pi[·] | t[·]·pi t,t[·] closed
Process contexts: p[·] ::= t[·] ? pi | t ? pi[·]
Contexts are used to talk about substitution that allows capturing of variables – as described
in [1, 2.1.18], given a context t[·]/pi[·]/p[·] and a term u, t[u]/pi[u]/p[u] is the the result of
replacing the hole [·] in t[·]/pi[·]/p[·] by u, allowing potential free variables in u to be captured.
We say that u is admissible for t[·]/pi[·]/p[·], if t[u]/pi[u]/p[u] is a valid term/stack/process
conforming to the closedness condition for terms making up stacks.
Now we can express β-reduction as the action of contracting a single redex: given a redex
(λx . u)v which is admissible for a context t[·]/pi[·]/p[·], we have
t[(λx . u)v]→β t[u[v/x]] pi[(λx . u)v]→β pi[u[v/x]] p[(λx . u)v]→β p[u[v/x]],
and any single β-reduction can uniquely be written this way. β-equivalence 'β is the
equivalence relation generated by β-reduction.
3 Bisimulation and >-equivalence
To reason efficiently about execution of processes with side effects – in particular to show
Turing completeness in Section 4 – we want to show that although the computation model
imposes a deterministic reduction strategy, we can perform β-reduction anywhere in a process
without changing its I/O behavior.
The natural choice of concept to capture ‘equivalence of I/O behavior’ is weak bisimilarity
(see [13, Section 4.2]), and in order to make this applicable to processes we have to reformulate
the operational semantics as a labeled transition system (LTS).
We use the set L = {r0, r1, rε,w0,w1, e} of labels, where r0, r1 represent reading of a 0 or
1, respectively, and w0, w1 represent writing of bits. rε represents the unsuccessful attempt
of reading on empty input, and e represents successful termination. The set Act = L ∪ {τ}
of actions contains the labels as well as the symbol τ representing a ‘silent’ transition, that
is used to represent effect-free evaluation.
The transition system on processes is now given as follows.
(λx . t[x]) ? t·pi τ−→ t[u] ? pi r ? t·u·v·pi r0−→ t ? pi w0 ? t·pi w0−→ t ? pi
tu ? pi
τ−→ t ? u·pi r ? t·u·v·pi r1−→ u ? pi w1 ? t·pi w1−→ t ? pi
cc ? t·pi τ−→ t ? kpi·pi r ? t·u·v·pi rε−→ v ? pi end ? pi e−→ >
kpi ? t·ρ τ−→ t ? pi
(4)
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Observe that the τ -transitions are in correspondence with the transitions of the evaluation
relation (2), and the labeled transitions correspond to the remaining transitions of the
execution relation (3).
We now recall the definition of weak bisimulation relation from [13, Section 4.2].
I Definition 2.
For processes p, q we write p τ=⇒ q for p τ−→∗ q, and for α 6= τ we write p α=⇒ q for
∃p′, q′ . p τ=⇒ p′ α−→ q′ τ=⇒ q.
A weak bisimulation on P is a binary relation R ⊆ P2 such that for all α ∈ Act and
(p, q) ∈ R we have
p
α−→ p′ ⇒ ∃q′ . q α=⇒ q′ ∧ (p′, q′) ∈ R and
q
α−→ q′ ⇒ ∃p′ . p α=⇒ p′ ∧ (p′, q′) ∈ R.
(5)
Two processes p, q are called weakly bisimilar (written p ≈ q), if there exists a weak
bisimulation relation R with (p, q) ∈ R.
We recall the following important properties of the weak bisimilarity relation ≈.
I Lemma 3. Weak bisimilarity is itself a weak bisimulation, and furthermore it is an
equivalence relation.
Proof. [13, Proposition 4.2.7] J
To show that β-equivalent processes are bisimilar, we have to find a bisimulation relation
containing β-equivalence. The following relation does the job.
I Definition 4 (γ-equivalence). γ-equivalence (written p 'γ q) is the equivalence relation on
processes that is generated by β-reduction and τ -transitions.
I Lemma 5. γ-equivalence of processes is a weak bisimulation.
Proof. It is sufficient to verify conditions (5) on the generators of γ-equivalence, i.e. one-step
β-reductions and τ -transitions. Therefore we show the following:
1. if p τ−→ q and p α−→ p′ then there exists q′ with q α=⇒ q′ and p′ 'γ q′
2. if p τ−→ q and q α−→ q′ then there exists p′ with p α=⇒ p′ and p′ 'γ q′
3. if p→β q and p α−→ p′ then there exists q′ with q α=⇒ q′ and p′ 'γ q′
4. if p→β q and q α−→ q′ then there exists p′ with p α=⇒ p′ and p′ 'γ q′
In the first case, the fact that the LTS can only branch if r is in head position, and this
does not involve τ -transitions, implies that α = τ and p′ = q, and we can choose q′ = q as
well. In the second case we have p α=⇒ q′ and thus can choose p′ = q′.
For cases 3 and 4, which we treat simultaneously, we have to analyze the structure of p
and q, which are of the form r[(λx . s)t] and r[s[t/x]] for some context r[·] (see Section 2.4).
The proof proceeds by cases on the structure of r[·].
If r[·] is of either of the forms (st ?pi)[·]1, w0?pi[·], w1?pi[·], cc?pi[·], (kpi ?ρ)[·], or end?pi[·],
then it is immediately evident that p and q can perform the same unique transition (if any),
and the results will again be β-equivalent (possibly trivially, since the redex can get deleted
in the transition).
If r[·] is of the form ((λy . u) ? pi)[·] then this is true as well, regardless of whether the
hole is in u or in pi (here the redex can be duplicated, if the hole is in the first term in pi).
1 The notation is meant to convey that we don’t care if the hole is in s, t, or pi.
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If r[·] is of the form r ? pi[·] then several transitions may be possible, but any transition
taken by either of p or q can also be taken by the other, and the results will again be
β-equivalent.
It remains to consider r[·] of the form [·]?pi. In this case, p = (λx . s)t?pi and q = s[t/x]?pi.
Here p can perform the transition p τ−→ (λx . s) ? t·pi which can be matched by q τ=⇒ q where
we have (λx . s) ? t·pi 'γ p 'γ q. In the other direction we have p α=⇒ q′ for every q α−→ q′ since
p
τ=⇒ q. J
The following definition and corollary makes the link between the execution relation (3) and
the LTS (4).
I Definition 6. Two execution contexts (p, ι, o), (q, ι′, o′) are called >-equivalent (written
(p, ι, o) ∼> (q, ι′, o′)), if for all ι′′, o′′ ∈ {0, 1}∗ we have
(p, ι, o) ∗ (>, ι′′, o′′) iff (q, ι′, o′) ∗ (>, ι′′, o′′).
I Corollary 7.
1. p ≈ q implies (p, ι, o) ∼> (q, ι, o) for all ι, o ∈ {0, 1}∗.
2. (p, ι, o) ∗ (q, ι′, o′) implies (p, ι, o) ∼> (q, ι′, o′).
3. (p, ι, o) ∼> (>, ι′, o′) implies (p, ι, o) ∗ (>, ι′, o′).
Proof. For the first claim we show that
p ≈ q, (p, ι, o) ∗ (>, ι′, o′) implies (q, ι, o) ∗ (>, ι′, o′)
by induction on the length of (p, ι, o) ∗ (>, ι′, o′). The base case is clear. For the induction
step assume that (p, ι, o) (p∗, ι∗, o∗) ∗ (>, ι′, o′). If the initial transition is a (τ) in the
execution relation (3), then have p∗ ∼= q, ι∗ = ι and o∗ = o, and we can apply the induction
hypothesis. If the initial transition corresponds to another clause in (3), then there is a
corresponding transition p α−→ q with α ∈ L in the LTS (4), and by bisimilarity there exists a
q∗ with q α=⇒ q∗ and p∗ ≈ q∗. Now the induction hypothesis implies (q∗, ι∗, o∗) ∗ (>, ι′, o′),
and from q α=⇒ q∗ we can deduce (q, ι, o) ∗ (q∗, ι∗, o∗) by cases on α.
The second claim follows since  is deterministic.
The third claim follows since (>, ι′, o′) can not perform any more transitions. J
4 Expressivity
In this section we show that the machine with I/O is Turing complete, i.e. that every
computable f : N⇀ N can be implemented in the sense of Def. 1 by a process p.
Roughly speaking, given f , we define a process p that reads the input, transforms it into
a Church numeral, applies a term t that computes f on the level of Church numerals, and
then writes the result out.
To decompose the task we define terms R and W for reading and writing, with the
properties that (R ∗ pi,bin(n), o) ∼> (n ? pi, ε, o) (n is the n-th Church numeral), and
(Wn ∗ pi, ι, ε) ∼> (>, ι,bin(n)) for all n ∈ N.
Now the naive first attempt to combine R and W with the term t computing the function
would be something like W (tR), but this would only work if the operational semantics was
call by value. The solution is to use Krivine’s storage operators [9] which where devised
precisely to simulate call by value in call by name, and we use a variation of them.
The following definition introduces the terms R and W , after giving some auxiliary
definitions.
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I Definition 8.
E,Z,B,C,H, Y, S are λ-terms satisfying
B n 'β 2n E (2n) s t 'β s Y t 'β t (Y t)
C n 'β 2n+ 1 E (2n+ 1) s t 'β t
H n 'β floor(n/2) Z (0) s t 'β s
S n 'β n+ 1 Z (n+ 1) s t 'β t
for all terms s, t and n ∈ N, where n is the Church numeral λfx . fnx.2
The terms F , R, W are defined as follows:
F = λhy . h(S y)3
R = Y Q 0 where Q = λxn . r(x(B n))(x(C n))n
W = Y V where V = λxn .Z n end(E n(w0x(H n))(w1x(H n)))
The next three lemmas explain the roles of the terms R,F , and W .
I Lemma 9. For all n ∈ N, pi ∈ Π and o ∈ {0, 1}∗ we have (R?pi, bin(n), o) ∼> (n ? pi, ε, o).
Proof. For all n ∈ N we have Y Qn 'β Q(Y Q)n 'β r(Y Q(2n))(Y Q(2n+ 1))n, and thus
(Y Qn ? pi, ε, o) ∼> (n ? pi, ε, o)
(Y Qn ? pi, 0ι, o) ∼> (Y Q (2n) ? pi, ι, o)
(Y Qn ? pi, 1ι, o) ∼> (Y Q (2n+ 1) ? pi, ι, o)
The claim follows by induction on the length of bin(n), since bin(2n) = bin(n)0 for n > 0,
and bin(2n+ 1) = bin(n)1. J
I Lemma 10. For n ∈ N and t any closed term, we have nF t 0 'β t n.
Proof. This is because nF t0 'β Fn t 0 'β t (Sn0) 'β t n, where the second step can be
shown by induction on n. J
I Lemma 11. For all n ∈ N, pi ∈ Π and ι ∈ {0, 1}∗ we have (Wn ? pi, ι, ε) ∼> (>, ι,bin(n)).
Proof. We have W n 'β V W n 'β Z n end(E n(w0W (H n))(w1W (H n))), and therefore
(W 0 ? pi, ι, o) ∼> (end ? pi, ι, o) ∼> (>, ι, o)
(W (2n) ? pi, ι, o) ∼> (w0W (H (2n)) ? pi, ι, o) ∼> (W (n) ? pi, ι, 0o) for (n > 0)
(W (2n+ 1) ? pi, ι, o) ∼> (w1W (H (2n+ 1)) ? pi, ι, o) ∼> (W (n) ? pi, ι, 1o).
The claim follows again by induction on the length of bin(n). J
I Theorem 12. Every computable function f : N⇀ N can be implemented by a process p.
Proof. From [5, Thm. 4.23] we know that there exists a term t with t n 'β f(n) for
n ∈ dom(f). The process p is given by R ? F ·t·0·F ·W ·0. Indeed, for n ∈ dom(f) we have
(R ? F ·t·0·F ·W ·0,bin(n), ε) ∼> (n ? F ·t·0·F ·W ·0, ε, ε) ∼> (nFt0 ? F ·W ·0, ε, ε)
∼> (t n ? F ·W ·0, ε, ε) ∼> (f(n) ? F ·W ·0, ε, ε)
∼> (W f(n) ? ε, ε, ε) ∼> (>, ε,bin(f(n)))
and we deduce (R ? F ·t·0·F ·W ·0,bin(n), ε) ∗ (>, ε,bin(f(n))) by Corollary 7-3. J
2 Such terms exist by elementary λ-calculus, see e.g. [5, Chapters 3,4]. In particular, Y is known as fixed
point operator.
3 This is (part of) a storage operator for Church numerals [9].
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5 Realizability and Triposes
The aim of this section is to describe how the presence of I/O instructions allows to define
new realizability models, which we do in the categorical language of triposes and toposes[21].
In Subsection 5.1 we give a categorical reading of Krivine’s realizability interpretation as
described in [10] and show how it gives rise to triposes. In Subsection 5.2 we show how the
definitions can be adapted to the syntax and machine with I/O, and how this allows us to
define new realizability models from specifications.
The interpretation of Krivine realizability in terms of triposes is due to Streicher [18],
and has further been explored in [2]. However, the presentation here is more straightforward
since the constructions and proofs do not rely on ordered combinatory algebras, but directly
rephrase Krivine’s constructions categorically.
5.1 Krivine’s classical realizability
Throughout this subsection we work with the syntax (1) without I/O instructions but with
stack constants.
Krivine’s realizability interpretation is always given relative to a set of processes called a
‘pole’ – the choice of pole determines the interpretation.
I Definition 13. A pole is a set ‚ ⊆ Λ?Π of processes which is saturated, in the sense that
p ∈‚ and p′  p implies p′ ∈‚.
As Miquel [15] demonstrated, the pole can be seen as playing the role of the parameter R in
Friedman’s negative translation [3]. In the following we assume that a pole ‚ is fixed.
A truth value is by definition a set S ⊆ Π of stacks. Given a truth value S and a term t,
we write t  S – and say ‘t realizes S’ – if ∀pi ∈ S . t ? pi ∈‚. We write S‚ = {t ∈ Λ | t  S}
for the set of realizers of Π. So unlike in Kleene realizability the elements of a truth value
are not its realizers – they should rather be seen as ‘refutations’, and indeed larger subsets
of Π represent ‘falser’ truth values4; in particular falsity is defined as
⊥ = Π.
Given truth values S, T ⊆ Π, we define the implication S ⇒ T as follows.
S ⇒ T = S‚·T = {s·pi | s  S, pi ∈ T}
With these definitions we can formulate the following lemma, which relates refutations of a
truth value S with realizers of its negation.
I Lemma 14. Given pi ∈ S ⊆ Π, we have kpi  S ⇒ ⊥.
Proof. We have to show that kpi ? t·ρ ∈ ‚ for all t  S and ρ ∈ Π. This is because
kpi ? t·ρ  t ? pi, where pi ∈ S and t  S. J
A (semantic) predicate on a set I is a function ϕ : I → P (Π) from I to truth values. On
semantic predicates we define the basic logical operations of falsity, implication, universal
4 For this reason, Miquel [15, 16] calls the elements of P (Π) falsity values.
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quantification, and reindexing by
⊥(i) = Π (falsity)
(ϕ⇒ ψ)(i) = ϕ(i)⇒ ψ(i) = ϕ(i)‚·ψ(i) (implication)
∀f (θ)(i) =
⋃
f(j)=i θ(j) (universal quantification)
f∗ϕ = ϕ ◦ f (reindexing)
(6)
for ϕ,ψ : I → P (Π), θ : J → P (Π) and f : J → I. Thus, for any function f : J → I, the
function ∀f (called ‘universal quantification along f ’) maps predicates on J to predicates on
I5, and the function f∗ (called ‘reindexing along f ’) maps predicates on I to predicate on J .
We write ∀I for universal quantification along the terminal projection I → 1.
Next, we come to the concept of ‘truth/validity’ of the interpretation. We can not simply
call a truth value ‘true’ if it has a realizer – this would lead to inconsistency as soon as the
pole ‚ is nonempty, since kpit  ⊥ for any process t ? pi ∈‚. The solution is to single out a
set PL of ‘well-behaved’ realizers called ‘proof-like terms’. We recall the definition from [10].
I Definition 15. The set PL ⊆ Λ of proof-like terms is the set of terms t that do not contain
any continuations kpi.
As Krivine [10, pg. 2] points out, t is a proof-like term if and only if it does not contain any
stack constant pi0 ∈ Π0 (since continuation terms kpi necessarily contain a stack constant at
the end of pi, and conversely stacks can only occur as continuations in a term).
Proof-like terms give us a concept of logical validity – a truth value S is called valid, if
there exists a proof-like term t with t  S.
With this notion, we are ready to define the centerpiece of the realizability model, which
is the entailment relation on predicates.
I Definition 16. For any set I and integer n, the (n+ 1)-ary entailment relation (`I) on
predicates on I is defined by
ϕ1 . . . ϕn `I ψ if and only if ∃t ∈ PL . t  ∀I(ϕ1 ⇒ . . .⇒ ϕn ⇒ ψ).
If the right hand side proposition holds, we call t a realizer of ϕ1 . . . ϕn `I ψ.
Thus, ϕ1 . . . ϕn `I ψ means that the truth value ∀I(ϕ1 ⇒ . . . ⇒ ϕn ⇒ ψ) is valid. More
explicitly this can be written out as
∃t ∈ PL ∀i ∈ I, u1 ∈ ϕ1(i)‚, . . . , un ∈ ϕn(i)‚, pi ∈ ψ(i) . t ? u1· . . .·un·pi ∈‚.
With the aim to show that the semantic predicates form a tripos in Theorem 22, we now
prove that the entailment ordering models the logical rules in Table (1). The first eight rules
form a standard natural deduction system for (the ⊥,⇒ fragment of) classical propositional
logic, but for universal quantification we give categorically inspired rules that bring us quicker
to where we want, and in particular avoid having to deal with variables.
I Lemma 17. The rules displayed in Table 1 are admissible for the entailment relation, in
the sense that if the hypotheses hold then so does the conclusion.
5 The usual ∀x :A from predicate logic corresponds to taking f to be a projection map pi1 : Γ×A→ Γ,
see e.g. [8, Chapter 4].
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Table 1 Admissible rules for the entailment relation.
(Ax)
ϕ `I ϕ
Γ `I ⊥ (⊥E)Γ `I ψ
Γ, ϕ `I ψ (⇒I)Γ `I ϕ⇒ ψ
Γ `I ψ ∆ `I ψ ⇒ θ (⇒E)
Γ,∆ `I θ
Γ `I ψ (S)
σ(Γ) `I ψ (PeL)∆ | Γ `I ((ψ ⇒ ⊥)⇒ ψ)⇒ ψ
Γ `I ψ (W)
A,Γ `I ψ
A,A,Γ `I ψ (C)
A,Γ `I ψ
f∗Γ `J ξ (∀I)Γ `I ∀fξ
Γ `I ∀fξ (∀E)
f∗Γ `J ξ
ϕ,ψ, θ are predicates on I, i.e. functions I → P (Π), and Γ ≡ ϕ1 . . . ϕn and ∆ ≡ ψ1 . . . ψm
are lists of such predicates. ξ is a predicate on J , and f : J → I is a function. σ is
a permutation of {1, . . . , n}. f∗Γ is an abbreviation for f∗ϕ1 . . . f∗ϕn, and σ(Γ) is an
abbreviation for ϕσ(1) . . . ϕσ(n).
Proof. (Ax) rule: The conclusion is realized by λx . x.
(⊥E) rule: every realizer of the hypothesis is also a realizer of the conclusion, since
ψ(i) ⊆ ⊥(i) = Π for all i ∈ I.
(⇒I) rule: the hypothesis and the conclusion have precisely the same realizers.
(⇒E) rule: if t realizes ∆ `I ψ ⇒ θ and u realizes Γ `i ψ then Γ,∆ `i θ is realized by
λx1 . . . xny1 . . . ym . ty1 . . . ym(ux1 . . . xn).
(PeL) rule (‘Peirce’s law’): the conclusion is realized by cc. To see this, let i ∈ I,
t  (ψ(i)⇒ ⊥)⇒ ψ(i), and pi ∈ ψ(i). Then we have cc ? t·pi  t ? kpi·pi, which is in ‚ since
kpi·pi ∈ (ψ(i)⇒ ⊥)⇒ ψ(i) by Lemma 14 and the definition (6) of implication.
(W) rule: if t realizes Γ `I ψ, then λx . t realizes A,Γ `I ψ.
(C) rule: if t realizes A,A,Γ `I ψ, then λx . txx realizes A,Γ `I ψ.
(S) rule: if t realizes Γ `I ψ, then λxσ(1) . . . xσ(n) . tx1 . . . xn realizes σ(Γ) `I ψ.
(∀I) and (∀E) rules: Γ `I ∀fξ and f∗Γ `J ξ have exactly the same realizers. Indeed, a
realizer of f∗Γ `J ξ is a term t satisfying
∀j ∈ J, u1 ∈ ϕ1(f(j))‚, . . . , un ∈ ϕn(f(j))‚, pi ∈ ξ(j) . t ? u1· . . .·un·pi ∈‚,
and a realizer of Γ `J ∀fξ is a term t satisfying
∀i ∈ I, u1 ∈ ϕ1(i)‚, . . . , un ∈ ϕn(i)‚, pi ∈
⋃
f(j)=i ξ(j) . t ? u1· . . .·un·pi ∈‚,
and both statements can be rephrased as a quantification over pairs (i, j) with f(j) = i. J
We only defined the propositional connectives ⊥,⇒, since >,∧,∨,¬ can be encoded as
follows:
> ≡ ⊥ ⇒ ⊥ ¬ϕ ≡ ϕ⇒ ⊥
ϕ ∧ ψ ≡ (ϕ⇒ (ψ ⇒ ⊥))⇒ ⊥ ϕ ∨ ψ ≡ (ϕ⇒ ⊥)⇒ ψ (7)
With these encodings it is routine to show the following.
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I Lemma 18. With the connectives >,∧,∨,¬ encoded as in (7), the rules of propositional
classical natural deduction (e.g. system Nc in [19, Section 2.1.8]) are derivable from the rules
in Table 1.
With this we can show that for any set I, the binary part of the entailment relation
makes P (Π)I into a Boolean prealgebra.
I Definition 19. A Boolean prealgebra is a preorder (B,≤) which
1. has binary joins and meets – denoted by x ∨ y and x ∧ y for x, y ∈ D,
2. has a least element ⊥ and a greatest element >,
3. is distributive in the sense that x ∧ (y ∨ z) ∼= (x ∧ y) ∨ (x ∧ z) for all x, y, z ∈ B, and
4. is complemented, i.e. for every x ∈ D there exists a ¬x with x ∧ ¬x ∼= ⊥ and x ∨ ¬x ∼= >.
I Lemma 20. Writing ϕ ≤ ψ for ϕ `I ψ, (P (Π)I ,≤) is a Boolean prealgebra.
Proof. The (Ax) rule implies that ≤ is reflexive, and transitivity follows from the derivation
ϕ `I ψ
ψ `I θ
`I ψ ⇒ θ
ϕ `I θ
.
Thus, ≤ is a preorder on P (Π)I .
The joins, meets, complements, and least and greatest element are given by the corre-
sponding logical operations as defined in (6) and (7).
The required properties all follow from derivability of corresponding entailments and
rules in classical natural deduction – for example, ϕ ∧ ψ is a binary meet of ϕ and ψ since
(∗) the entailments ϕ ∧ ψ `I ϕ and ϕ ∧ ψ `I ψ and the rule θ `I ϕ θ `I ψ
θ `I ϕ ∧ ψ
are derivable.
Distributivity follows from derivability of the entailments ϕ ∧ (ψ ∨ θ) `I (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ (ϕ ∧ θ)
and (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ (ϕ ∧ θ) `I ϕ ∧ (ψ ∨ θ). J
We now come to triposes, which are a kind categorical model for higher order logic. We use
a ‘strictified’ version of the original definition [7, Def. 1.2] since this bypasses some subtleties
and is sufficient for our purposes. Furthermore, we are only interested modeling classical
logic here, and thus can restrict attention to triposes whose fibers are Boolean (instead of
Heyting) prealgebras.
I Definition 21. A strict6 Boolean tripos is a contravariant functor P : Setop → Ord from
the category of sets to the category of preorders such that
for every set I, the preorder P(I) is a Boolean prealgebra, and for any function f : J → I,
the induced monotone map P(f) : P(I)→ P(J) preserves all Boolean prealgebra structure.
6 ‘Strict’ refers to the facts that (i) P is a functor, not merely a pseudofunctor (ii) the Boolean prealgebra
structure is preserved ‘on the nose’ by the monotone maps P(f) (iii) the Beck-Chevalley condition is
required up to equality, not merely isomorphism, (iv) we require equality and uniqueness in the last
condition. Every strict tripos is a tripos in the usual sense, and conversely it can be shown that any
tripos is equivalent to a strict one.
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for any f : J → I, P(f) has left and right adjoints7 ∃f a P(f) a ∀f such that
for any pullback square8
L K
J I
q
p g
f
(8)
we have P(g) ◦ ∀f = ∀q ◦ P(p) (this is the Beck-Chevalley condition), and
there exists a generic predicate, i.e. a set Prop and an element tr ∈ P(Prop) such that for
every set I and ϕ ∈ P(I) there exists a unique function f : I → Prop with P(f)(tr) = ϕ.
The assignment I 7→ (P (Π)I ,≤) extends to a functor P‚ : Setop → Ord by letting
P‚(f) = f∗, i.e. mapping every function f : J → I to the reindexing function along f , which
is monotone since every realizer of ϕ `I ψ is also a realizer of ϕ ◦ f `J ψ ◦ f .
I Theorem 22. P‚ is a strict Boolean tripos.
Proof. We have shown in Lemma 20 that the preorders (P (Π)I ,≤) are Boolean prealgebras.
It is immediate from (6) that the reindexing functions f∗ preserve ⊥ and ⇒, and the other
Boolean operations are preserved since they are given by encodings.
The identity function id : P (Π)→ P (Π) is a generic predicate for P‚.
The (∀I) and (∀E) rules together imply that the operation ∀f : P (Π)I → P (Π)J is right
adjoint to f∗ for any f : J → I. Existential quantification along f : J → I is given by
∃f = ¬ ◦ ∀f ◦ ¬, which is left adjoint to f∗ since
¬∀f¬ϕ `I ψ iff ¬ψ `I ∀f¬ϕ iff f∗¬ψ `J ¬ϕ iff ¬f∗ψ `J ¬ϕ iff ϕ `J f∗ψ
for all ϕ : J → P (Π) and ψ : I → P (Π).
It remains to verify the Beck-Chevalley condition. Given a square as in (8) we have
g∗∀f (ϕ(k)) =
⋃{ϕ(j) | f(j) = g(k)} and ∀q(p∗(k)) = ⋃{ϕ(j) | ∃l . pl = j ∧ ql = k},
and the two terms are equal since the square is a pullback. J
Thus we obtain a tripos P‚ for each pole ‚. As Hyland, Johnstone, and Pitts showed in [7],
every tripos P gives rise to a topos Set[P] via the tripos-to-topos construction. Since the
fibers of the triposes P‚ are Boolean prealgebras, the toposes Set[P‚] are Boolean as well,
which means that their internal logic is classical.
5.1.1 Consistency
Triposes of the form P‚ can be degenerate in two ways: if‚ is empty then P‚(I) ' (P (I),⊆)
for every set I, and the topos Set[P‚] is equivalent to the category Set.
If, in the other extreme, the pole is so big that there exists a proof-like t realizing ⊥,
i.e. falsity is valid in the model, then we have P‚(I) ' 1 for all I (since t realizes every
entailment ϕ `I ψ), and the topos Set[P‚] is equivalent to the terminal category.
By consistency we mean that falsity is not valid, or equivalently that
∀t ∈ PL ∃pi ∈ Π . t ? pi 6∈‚. (9)
7 ‘Adjoint’ in the sense of ‘adjoint functor’, where monotone maps are viewed as functors between
degenerate categories.
8 The square being a pullback means that f ◦ p = g ◦ q and ∀jk . f(j) = g(k)⇒ ∃!l . p(l) = j ∧ q(l) = k.
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The ‘canonical’ (according to Krivine [12]) non-trivial consistent pole is the thread model,
which is given by postulating a stack constant pit for each proof-like term t, and defining
‚ = {p ∈ Λ?Π | ¬∃t ∈ PL . t ? pit  ∗ p}. Then the processes t ? pit are not in ‚ for any
proof-like t, which ensures the validity of condition (9).
In the next section we show how the presence of side effects allows to define a variety of
new, ‘meaningful’ consistent poles.
5.2 Krivine realizability with I/O
The developments of the previous section generalize pretty much directly to the syntax with
I/O. Concretely, we carry over the definitions of pole, truth value, realizer, predicate, and of
the basic logical operations ⊥,⇒,∀, by replacing Λ with Λe, Π with Πe, and Λ?Π with P.
We point out that in presence of effects, Definition 13 only means that ‚ is saturated
w.r.t. effect-free evaluation, in contrast to Miquel’s approach [14] where a pole is a set of
(what we call) execution contexts, closed under the entire execution relation.
The concept of proof-like term deserves some reexamination. It turns out that the
appropriate concept of proof-like term is ‘term not containing any side effects’. This is
consistent with Definition 15 if we read ‘free of side effects’ as ‘free of non-logical constructs’,
which are the stack constants in Krivine’s case. Continuation terms, on the other hand, can
be considered proof-like. We redefine therefore:
I Definition 23. The set PL ⊆ Λe of proof-like terms is the set of terms not containing any
of the constants r,w0,w1, end.
With this rephrased definition of proof-like term, we can define the entailment relation on
the extended predicates in the same way:
I Definition 24. For any set I and integer n, the (n+ 1)-ary entailment relation (`I) on
the set P (Πe)I of extended predicates on I is defined by
ϕ1 . . . ϕn `I ψ if and only if ∃t ∈ PL . t  ∀I(ϕ1 ⇒ . . .⇒ ϕn ⇒ ψ).
As a special case, the ordering on extended predicates is defined by
ϕ ≤ ψ if and only if ∃t ∈ PL . t  ∀I(ϕ⇒ ψ).
With these definitions, we can state analogues of Lemma 20 and Theorem 22:
I Theorem 25.
For each set I, the order (P (Πe)I ,≤) of extended predicates is a Boolean prealgebra.
The assignment I 7→ (P (Πe)I ,≤) gives rise to a strict Boolean tripos P‚ : Setop → Ord.
Proof. This follows from the arguments in Section 5.1, since the proofs of Lemmas 14,17,
18,20, and of Theorem 22 are not obstructed in any way by the new constants, nor do they
rely on stack constants. The redefinition of ‘proof-like term’ does not cause any problems
either, since we never relied on proof-like terms not containing continuation terms. J
The above rephrasing of the definition of proof-like term admits an intuitive reformulation
of the consistency criterion (9):
I Lemma 26. A pole ‚ is consistent if and only if every p ∈‚ \ {>} contains a non-logical
constant, i.e. one of r,w0,w1, end.
Proof. If every element of p ∈‚ \ {>} contains a non-logical constant, then t ? ε is not in
‚ for any proof-like t, which implies (9).
On the other hand, if t ∗ pi ∈‚ does not contain any non-logical constant then kpit is a
proof-like term which realizes ⊥, since for any ρ ∈ Πe we have kpit?ρ  kpi?t·ρ  t∗pi ∈‚. J
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5.2.1 Poles from specifications
The connection between poles and specifications is established by the following lemma.
I Lemma 27. Every set ‚ of processes that is closed under weak bisimilarity is a pole.
Proof. This is because p ≈ q whenever p  q, which follows from Lemma 5. J
Since we can assume that for any reasonable specification the processes implementing it are
closed under weak bisimilarity, we can thus conclude that for any specification, the set of
processes implementing it is a pole. For example:
‚cp is the set of processes that read the input, copy every bit immediately to the output,
and terminate when the input is empty. We have Y ? (λx . r(w0x)(w1x)end) ∈‚cp.
‚cp′ contains the processes that first read the entire input, and then write out the same
string and terminate. We have R ? F ·W ·0 ∈‚cp′ with the notations of Section 4.
For any partial function f : N⇀ N, the pole‚f consists of those processes that implement
f in the sense of Definition 1.
Since poles are closed under unions, we can define the pole ‚F = ⋃f∈F ‚f for any set
F ⊆ (N⇀ N) of partial functions.
5.2.2 Toposes from computable functions
We are particularly interested in the poles ‚f associated to computable functions f , and we
want to use the associated triposes Pf = P‚f and toposes Set[Pf ] to study these functions.
The following theorem provides a first ‘sanity check’, in showing that the associated
models are non-degenerate.
I Theorem 28. Let f : N⇀ N.
‚f is consistent if and only if f is not totally undefined.
‚f is non-empty if and only if f is computable.
Proof. The first claim follows from Lemma 26. If n ∈ dom(f) and t ? pi implements f , then
(t ? pi, bin(n), ε) must terminate and thus t ? pi must contain an end instruction. The totally
undefined function, on the other hand, is by definition implemented by every process.
For the second claim, we have shown in Theorem 12 that every computable f is imple-
mented by some process. Conversely, every implementable function is computable since the
Krivine machine with I/O is an effective model of computation. J
5.3 Discussion and future work
The structure and properties of the toposes Set[Pf ] remain mysterious for the moment, and
in future work we want to explore which kind of properties of f are reflected in Set[Pf ]. In
the spirit of Grothendieck [4] we want to view the toposes Set[Pf ] as geometric rather than
logical objects, the guiding intuition being that Set[Pf ] can be seen as representation of ‘the
space of solutions to the algorithmic problem of computing f ’, encoding e.g. information on
how algorithms computing f can be decomposed into simpler parts.
Evident problems to investigate are to understand the lattice of truth values in Set[Pf ],
and to determine for which pairs f, g of functions the associated toposes are equivalent, and
which functions can be separated.
A more audacious goal is to explore whether Set[Pf ] can teach us something about the
complexity of a computable function f . The Krivine machine with I/O seems to be a model
of computation that is fine grained enough to recognize and differentiate time complexity
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of different implementations of f , but it remains to be seen in how far this information is
reflected in the ‘geometry’ of Set[Pf ].
Acknowledgements. Thanks to Jakob Grue Simonsen and Thomas Streicher for many
discussions.
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